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DEFINING PARENTHOOD:  EVOLUTION OR 
PENDULUM SWING? 
 
BY:  RUFINA D. BEEM* 
 
“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life.” Justice O’Connor1 
INTRODUCTION 
There are some things in life that everyone should have the freedom 
to do.  Everyone should be able to create a family, experience the joy of 
being a parent, and raise children in a manner based upon personal 
choices and preferences.  Indeed, this right of a parent has been 
recognized as fundamental.2  The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause has a substantive component that “provides heightened protection 
against government interference with certain fundamental rights and 
liberty interests.”3 The liberty interest included in this component is a 
parent’s fundamental right to make decisions concerning “the care, 
custody, and control of their children.”4  It has been soundly determined 
by the U.S. Supreme Court that the Constitution protects a parent’s 
rights.5  What the Constitution does not do, however, is define what 
constitutes a parent. 
                                                            
* Rufina D. Beem, Esq. graduated from Pace Law School, J.D., cum laude, in May 2012.  
She was admitted to the New York State Bar in February 2013 and is currently an 
Associate in the Matrimonial and Family Law Department at Miller, Zeiderman & 
Wiederkehr, LLP in White Plains, New York. 
1 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
2 Id. at 926–27. 
3 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 720 (1997). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
Today’s parents are a virtual kaleidoscope of combinations as a 
result of the cultural explosion of alternative methods of family 
formation such as surrogacy and assisted reproductive technologies 
(ART).6  People who desire to be parents are no longer bound by the 
natural course of sexual reproduction, and instead have seized control of 
biology through science and are wielding its power by creating beautiful 
families every day.  For example, 41,000 children were born through 
ART in 2006.7 Many of these children were born to same sex couples.8  
In 2009, the number of infants born through ART rose to 60,190.9  It is 
likely that this number is continuing to grow today. 
As the use of alternative methods of family formation has become 
arguably "mainstream," novel issues regarding how to define a parent 
under the law have arisen and courts and legislatures have struggled to 
keep up.10  The legal definition of a parent has experienced an 
unprecedented evolution in the last four decades, particularly in the 
context of how genetic ties and marriage are weighed as determining 
factors.11  Parts I and II of this paper tell the story of the way the legal 
definition of a parent has evolved from its traditional roots, analyzes the 
way that courts have weighed the importance of the biological 
connection and marriage in defining parenthood, and argues that the 
evolution has inevitably resulted in a totality of the circumstances test.  
In light of the continuing evolution of societal views with respect to 
issues such as same sex marriage, polyamory, and polygamy, Part III 
attempts to predict the future legal definition of a parent.  As such, this 
paper questions how far the liberty interests of parents will take us in 
terms of defining parentage, and argues that expanding views towards 
who can marry may actually be causing the legal definition of a parent to 
revert back to times past, much like a pendulum swing. 
                                                            
6 See generally Linda D. Elrod, A Child’s Perspective of Defining a Parent: The Case for 
Intended Parenthood, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 245 (2011). 
7 Elrod, supra note 6, at 247 (citing Centers for Disease Control, Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (ART) Success Rates: National Summary and Fertility Clinic Reports: 2006 
ART Report (indicating there were 138,198 ART cycles performed at 483 fertility clinics 
in 2006, resulting in 41,343 live births)). 
8 Id. (citing The Williams Institute, Census Snapshot: United States (Dec. 2007), 
available at http:// 
www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/USCensusSnapshot.pdf.; See also 
Courtney G. Joslin, Interstate Recognition of Parentage in a Time of Disharmony: Same-
Sex Parent Families and Beyond, 70 OHIO ST. L. J. 563, 591 n.153-55 (2009)). 
9 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009 Assisted Reproductive Technology 
Report (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2009/index.htm.  
10 Elrod, supra note 6, at 252. 
11 See Elrod, supra note 6.  
I. THE PARENTS OF YESTERDAY 
In the past, there were three traditional ways to become a parent: (1) 
“giving birth (mater sempe certe est)”;12 (2) “being married to the mother 
of the child (pater est quem nutpiea demonstrant)”;13 or (3) “adopting a 
child.”14  Families were created through biological and contractual 
relationships and, accordingly, the cultural conception of family was 
comprised of the husband, wife, and children who lived together as a 
natural unit.15 The definition of family was based upon the laws of 
nature, and it lived by rules that Americans regard as “self-evidently 
natural.”16 The concept of what comprised a family was defined 
according to age and gender.17 The father had authority over the family.18 
The mother was expected to “bear children, nurse them, and care for 
them.”19 
The marital presumption that a man who is married to the mother is 
the father of her children has existed for centuries.20  One of the policy 
reasons for the presumption was to assign responsibilities for the care of 
children.21 Furthermore, “[t]he main end and design of marriage [is] to 
ascertain and fix upon some certain person, to whom the care, the 
protection, the maintenance, and the education of the children should 
belong.”22  This marital presumption was strong and only overcome if 
the man had “no access” to the wife.23  There was a social stigma for 
illegitimate children, a cultural notion that U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
and the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 (UPA) have since sought to 
diffuse.24  One of the major purposes of the first version of the UPA was 
                                                            
12 Elrod, supra note 6, at 246 (citing Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001)). 
13 Id. (citing 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *455 (1765)).  
14 Id. (citing U.S. Bureau of the Census, Households by Type: 2000, Table 1, n.2)).  
15 Id. at 266. 
16 Janet L. Dolgin, Biological Evaluations: Blood, Genes, and Family, 41 AKRON L. REV. 
347, 353 (2008) (citing DAVID M. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL 
ACCOUNT 34 (2d ed. 1980)). 
17 Id. (citing David M. Schneider, American Kinship: A Cultural Account 35 (2d ed. 
1980)). 
18 Id. (citing David M. Schneider, American Kinship: A Cultural Account 36 (2d ed. 
1980)). 
19 Id. (citing David M. Schneider, American Kinship: A Cultural Account 35 (2d ed. 
1980)). 
20 Elrod, supra note 6, at 246 
21 Id. at 247. 
22 Elrod, supra note 6, at 246 n.6 (citing 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *455 
(1765)). 
23 David D. Meyer, Parenthood in A Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, 
Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 127 (2006). 
24 Id. at 129 (citing Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. 
REV. 477 (1967); Harry D. Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. 
Louisiana: First Decisions on Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 338 
(1969); Laurence C. Nolan, “Unwed Children’ and Their Parents Before the United 
to ensure full equality for all children in their legal relationship with both 
parents, “whatever the parents’ marital status.”25 
Another way to become a parent was through adoption.26  Adoption 
is a method to become a parent through a legal process pursuant to state 
statutes.27 It is characterized by the necessity of biological parents 
relinquishing and terminating their parental rights, and adoptive parents 
obtaining parental rights and responsibilities through the legal process.28  
Traditionally, adoption was viewed as a “substitute relation designed to 
replicate as closely as possible the biological original.”29  Infertile 
couples in the post World War II years turned to adoption to erase the 
“stigma of childlessness in an era of ‘compulsory parenthood.’”30  
However, many people were barred from the adoption process because 
of age, marital status, or sexual orientation.31 
 These traditional methods of family formation formed the legal 
framework for determining parentage for at least a century before 
alternative methods of family formation entered the scene.32  Sperm 
donation was legitimized as a cure for infertility in the 1950s and1960s.33  
England announced the first successful “test tube” birth in 1978.34 Egg 
donation and gestational surrogacy, where the surrogate serves as a 
carrier for another’s genetic child, were legalized in the early 1990s.35  
There was a thirty-seven percent increase in the number of in-vitro 
procedures performed in the United States between 1995 and 1998.36 
As the use of ART and surrogacy was becoming widespread, the 
traditional idea of a “nuclear family” was also evolving in parallel.  In 
1970, the number of families comprised of a married couple raising 
children was forty percent of all households; however, this number 
                                                                                                                                     
States Supreme Court From Levy to Michael H.: Unlikely Participants in Constitutional 
Jurisprudence,” 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (1999)).  
25 Id. 
26 Elrod, supra note 6, at 246. 
27 Id. at 259. 
28 Id. 
29 Meyer, supra note 23, at 126 (citing ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: 
ADOPTION, INFERTILITY, AND THE NEW WORLD OF CHILD PROTECTION (1999); Naomi 
Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077 (2003). 
30 Susan Frelich Appleton, Adoption in the Age of Reproductive Technology, 2004 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 393, 403 (2004). 
31 J. Herbie Difonzo & Ruth C. Stern, The Children of Baby M., 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 345 
(2011) (citing Stephanie Saul, Building a Baby, with Few Ground Rules, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 13, 2009, at 1.). 
32 Meyer, supra note 23, at 125. 
33 Noa Ben-Asher, The Curing Law: On the Evolution of Baby-Making Markets, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1885, 1888 (2009). 
34 Id. at 1900. 
35 Id. at 1888. 
36Id. at 1900 (citing DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS 28 (2006)). 
decreased to less than a quarter of a percent by 2000.”37  The number of 
gay and lesbian families with children more than tripled in the latter part 
of the 20th Century.38  The birth rate increased for women aged fifteen to 
forty-four, doubled for women aged forty to forty-four, and tripled for 
women aged forty-four to forty-nine.39  As family law scholar David 
Meyer observed, “[t]he domestic unit in early 21st century America [has 
become] a crazy quilt of one-parent households, blended families, 
singles, unmarried partnerships and same-sex unions.”40 By 2000, the 
landscape of what constituted a family in the United States had evolved 
so much that Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted, “[t]he demographic 
changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average 
American family.”41 
As the concept of family evolved, the definitions of legal parentage 
presented unique challenges in U.S. courts.  Apart from the UPA, which 
was revised in 2000 and again in 2002, there were few statutes for courts 
to leverage when deciding these new issues.42  Therefore, courts were 
frequently fashioning equitable solutions in light of the best interest of 
the child standard, and often times coming down with opposing 
decisions.43  The use of the best interest of the child standard did not 
provide clear direction for the courts.  For example, in Troxel v. 
Granville, the Supreme Court overruled the best interest standard to 
strike down visitation proceedings by grandparents or any third party 
because it violated the constitutional rights of the parents to make 
decisions about raising their children.44  Here, the Supreme Court 
declared that a parent’s constitutional right to have autonomy in 
parenting decisions was to be protected over the interests of the child to 
have a relationship with grandparents or other third parties.45  As David 
Meyer remarked, “[i]f the Court in Troxel was distressed over the 
breadth and novelty of a law that permitted ‘best interests’ over a 
parent’s objections, how much more shocking would it find a scheme 
that allowed the reassignment of parenthood on the same basis?”46  In 
                                                            
37 Meyer, supra note 23, at 132 (citing JASON FIELDS, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING 
ARRANGEMENTS:  2003, at 12–13 (U.S. Census Bureau 2003). 
38 Difonzo & Stern, supra note 31, at 347. 
39 Joyce A. Martin et al., Births:  Final Data for 2005, 56 NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS 
REPORT 6 (2007), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56_06.pdf.  
40 Meyer, supra note 23, at 133 (citing Siobhan Morrissey, The New Neighbors: 
Domestic Relations Law Struggles to Catch Up with Changes in Family Life,  ABA J., 
Mar. 2002, at 37, 38.). 
41 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63–64 (2000). 
42 Elrod, supra note 6, at 257. 
43 Id. at 262.  
44 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72–73. 
45 Id. 
46 David D. Meyer, The Constitutionality of “Best Interests” Parentage, 14 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 857, 865 (2006). 
other words, it would offend the fundamental rights of a parent if 
parenthood could be defined on the basis of a best interest of the child 
standard.47  Therefore, as society pushed forward into the era of 
alternative family formation and technologies raced ahead of the 
legislatures, the law and the courts struggled, with no clear standards, to 
deal with the conflicts these new arrangements created. 
II. THE PARENTS OF TODAY 
 A.  Parenting and the Biological Tie 
 America celebrated the birth of its first baby conceived by in 
vitro fertilization (IVF) in 1981.48  Twenty-five years later, at least 
54,656 babies were born in the United States using IVF and IVF-related 
procedures.49 In parallel with the growth of IVF, desiring parents also 
began entering into surrogacy arrangements.50 Today, an estimated 1,000 
surrogacy agreements are entered into each year.51  There are two kinds 
of surrogacy arrangements-gestational surrogacy and full surrogacy.52  In 
gestational surrogacy, an embryo is created in vitro in the surrogate by 
using the ova of another woman.53 Ninety-five percent of surrogates 
today are fertilized with the genetic material of another.54  However, in 
full surrogacy, the surrogate is impregnated with her own ova.55  
The parenting issues that arose as a result of these arrangements 
challenged the courts, particularly in the context of determining 
parentage through biological ties.56 Historically, defining parenthood 
through biological ties  had been a clear method.57 If a mother gave birth 
to a baby originating from her own ovum, it was easy to determine she 
                                                            
47 Id. at 865–66. 
48 U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 2006 Assisted Reproductive Technology 
Success Rates: National Summary and  Fertility Clinic Reports 1 (2008). 
49 Id. at 11.  
50 See DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 31. 
51 Id. at 356 (citing Karen Busby & Delaney Vun, Revisiting the Handmaid’s Tale:  
Feminist Theory Meets Empirical Research on Surrogate Mothers 14 (2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://claradoc.gpa.free.fr/doc/329.pdf.).  
52 Ben-Asher, supra note 33, at 1887. 
53 Id. 
54 DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 31, at 355 (citing KAREN BUSBY & DELANEY VUN, 
REVISITING THE HANDMAID’S TALE:  FEMINIST THEORY MEETS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON 
SURROGATE MOTHERS 8 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://claradoc.gpa.free.fr/doc/329.pdf.). 
55 Ben-Asher, supra note 33, at 1887. 
56 See Darra L. Hofman, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s Maybe:” A State-By-State Survey of 
Surrogacy Laws and Their Desparate Gender Impact, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 449 
(2009).  
57 Christen Blackburn, Family Law – Who Is a Mother? Determining Legal Maternity in 
Surrogacy Arrangements in Tennessee, 39 U. MEM.L. REV. 349, 353 (2009).  
was the mother.58 Similarly, the man who contributed the sperm that 
fertilized the ovum of the mother was the father.59  However, defining 
motherhood was not so clear when a gestational surrogate gave birth to 
child created by another woman’s genetic materials or when a full 
surrogate gave birth to a child genetically related to her pursuant to a 
contractual relationship with another woman.60 
Without a doubt, the case of In re Baby M, decided by the New 
Jersey Supreme Court in 1988, was one of the most notorious cases 
dealing with the determination of parentage in the context of surrogacy 
arrangements.61 Here, William Stern contracted with a surrogate, Mary 
Beth Whitehead, to be artificially inseminated with his sperm and to 
carry a child for him and his wife Elizabeth.62  The contract specified that 
Whitehead would surrender the child to the Sterns for adoption.63  
However, when the baby girl was born—named Melissa by the Sterns—
Mary Beth suffered an emotional crisis and refused to relinquish the 
child.64  A dramatic story unfolded, with Mary Beth actually fleeing to 
Florida with her husband and the baby and only returning the baby to the 
Sterns after arrest and a court order.65  The New Jersey courts had to 
answer the question—“[w]ho are the parents of Baby M?”66 Are the 
parents the genetically-related surrogate who also carried the baby and 
her husband, or the intended genetically-related father and wife who 
contracted with the surrogate to adopt the baby?67 The genetic factor 
alone could not determine which parties would raise Baby M as their 
own child.68 The trial court upheld the surrogacy contract under the best 
interest of the child analysis.69 As a result, it ordered that Mary Beth 
Whitehead’s parental rights be terminated, that sole custody of the child 
be granted to William Stern, and entered an order allowing the adoption 
of Melissa by Elizabeth Stern.70  The New Jersey Supreme Court 
reversed on the basis that the surrogacy contract was not only invalid, but 
that it was evil: 
It guarantees the separation of a child from its mother; 
it looks to adoption, regardless of suitability; it totally 
ignores the child; it takes the child from the mother 
                                                            
58 Id. 
59 See Hofman, supra note 56. 
60 Id. 
61 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
62 Id. at 1235.  
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 1236–37. 
65 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1237. 
66 Id. 
67 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1237 (N.J. 1988). 
68 Id. at 1237–38. 
69 Id. 
70 Id.  
regardless of her wishes and her maternal fitness; and 
it does all of this, it accomplishes all of its goals, 
through the use of money.71 
The aftermath of the decision in Baby M was widespread. The news 
media covered the story extensively, and the frenzy resulted in a “moral 
panic” about selling babies that had the effect of demonizing commercial 
surrogacy arrangements.72 The effects of this social mark are still being 
felt today, as many states still outlaw commercial surrogacy.73  The case 
of Baby M could not be decided solely based upon who was genetically 
related to the child since both sides could claim a genetic relationship, 
and so the court relied on the “evil” nature of the contract to tip the 
scales in favor of the genetic-mother surrogate.74 
 The case of Johnson v. Calvert was also a monumental case in 
the evolution of the legal definition of a parent. This case also posed the 
question of who is the mother: the genetic mother or the gestational 
mother?75 On January 15, 1990, Mark and Crispina Calvert, a married 
couple, signed a contract with Anna Johnson providing that an embryo 
created by the sperm of Mark and the egg of Crispina would be 
implanted in Anna and the child born would be the Calvert’s child.76  
However, relations deteriorated between the parties and they resorted to 
litigation to resolve the dispute over parentage.77 The trial court ruled 
that “Mark and Crispina were the child’s ‘genetic, biological and natural’ 
parents, that Anna had no ‘parental rights,’ and that “the surrogacy 
contract was legal and enforceable against Anna’s claims.”78 Although 
both the genetic mother—Crispina—and the birth mother—Anna—could 
potentially be considered mothers to the child under California law, 
which was modeled after the UPA, the court concluded that legal 
parentage should be assigned to Crispina and Mark based upon their 
intention to bring about the birth of the child.79 The court wrote: 
We conclude that although the [Uniform Parentage] 
Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity and giving 
birth as means of establishing a mother and child 
relationship, when the two means do not coincide in 
one woman, she who intended to procreate the child-
that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of 
                                                            
71 Id. at 1250. 
72 Elizabeth Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 109, 110-11 (2009). 
73 Elrod, supra note 6, at 255. 
74 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1250. 
75 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 777–78 (Cal. 1993). 
76 Id. at 778. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. at 782 (emphasis added). 
the child that she intended to raise as her own-is the 
natural mother under California law.80 
 
Thus, the traditional means of establishing parentage through 
biology, marriage, or adoption were expanded into the nebulous world of 
intent. Although the court was careful to limit the holding to the 
particular facts of the case, the precedent to consider intent in parenting 
disputes was born. 
 This intent-based decision was not accepted by every court, as 
seen in Belsito v. Clark, decided in Ohio one year after Johnson.81 In 
Belsito, an embryo comprised of genetic material from a married couple 
was implanted into the wife’s younger sister who had agreed to act as the 
surrogate.82 When the Belsitos were told that only the birth mother—
surrogate—could be listed on the child’s birth certificate, and the child 
would be considered illegitimate under Ohio law because the surrogate 
and the biological father were not married, the Belsitos filed a complaint 
for a declaratory judgment that it was unnecessary for them to adopt the 
child.83 The Belsitos contended that they were “the genetic and natural 
parents of that child and therefore entitled to be recognized as having the 
legal status of parents.”84   
Because both the wife and the sister could be considered the natural 
mother under Ohio law, the court was faced with a similar issue as in 
Johnson.85  The court rejected the intent standard from Johnson, stating 
that it was difficult to prove and posed the question, “who is the natural 
parent if both a nongenetic-providing surrogate and the female genetic 
provider agree that they both intend to procreate and raise the child?”86 
Instead, the court relied on the traditional biological connection to 
determine parentage—separating birth from the equation—in its 
reasoning to pronounce the Belsitos as the natural parents of the child 
being carried by the surrogate sister.87  The court stated, “[t]he test to 
identify who the natural parents should be, ‘Who are the genetic 
parents?’”88 
                                                            
80 Id.  
81 Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio 1994). 
82 Id. at 761. 
83 Id. at 762. 
84 Id.  
85 Compare Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 777–78 (Cal. 1993) (stating “[w]ho is the 
‘natural mother’ under California law?”), with Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 762 (stating “[t]he 
central question before the court is, who is to assume the legal status of natural parents of 
the unborn child carried by Carol S. Clark?”). 
86 Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 764. 
87 Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 766–67 (Ohio 1994) (finding that adoption of the 
child by the Belsitos was unnecessary).   
88 Id. at 766. 
 The tension between intent tests and genetic tests to determine 
parental rights and responsibilities became apparent in In re Marriage of 
Buzzanca.89 Here, Luanne and John Buzzanca, a husband and wife 
unable to conceive naturally, obtained egg and sperm donors and hired a 
surrogate to give birth to the child.90 There was no genetic relationship 
between the intended parents and the resulting child.91 When the 
Buzzancas decided to get divorced, John sought to disclaim any 
responsibility for the child, financial or otherwise.92 Luanne filed a 
petition, seeking to establish herself as the mother of the child and John 
as the father, which would presumably obligate John to pay her child 
support.93   
The trial court astonishingly reached the conclusion that the child 
had no lawful parents, relying on a stipulation by the surrogate and her 
husband that they were not the biological parents and the fact that 
Luanne neither contributed an egg nor gave birth to the child.94 The 
appellate court found this result to be unacceptable, and extended the 
intent standard from Johnson to find that John and Luanne were the 
natural parents of the child.95 Thus, John and Luanne were responsible 
for supporting the child notwithstanding the fact they were getting 
divorced.96 The court also relied on the decision in People v. Sorensen, 
which held that when a husband consents to allowing his wife to be 
artificially inseminated, he is presumed to be the “lawful father” because 
he consented to the procreation of the child.97 The court reasoned that 
because fatherhood can be established apart from giving birth or being 
genetically-related to a child—and “but-for” the Buzzancas intending on 
creating the child the child would not exist—the seemingly only “right” 
solution was that they were the natural parents of the child.98 In this case, 
a genetic relationship could not establish parentage to the resulting child 
because neither John nor Luanne contributed genetic material.99 
Additionally, the court leaned partly on the marital presumption to 
establish John’s fatherhood and corresponding responsibilities and 
obligations to support the child.100 The intent of the Buzzancas to parent 
                                                            
89 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998). 
90 Id. at 282. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 282–83. 
94 Id. at 282. 
95 In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Ct. App. 1998). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 286 (discussing People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968)). 
98 Id. at 291. 
99 Id. at 293. 
100 Id. at 291–92. 
the child also weighed heavily in the court’s decision to declare the 
divorcing parties as parents.101 
 This string of early cases illustrates how the courts wrestled with 
the concept of genetic ties and what this meant for determining parentage 
when faced with the complicated facts of surrogacy cases. The results 
show that deference to the biological tie remains, but that it is often 
inadequate to be the only factor when determining parentage.102 The 
novel issues that IVF and surrogacy arrangements brought out during this 
time began the dramatic evolution of the legal definition of a parent, and 
showed that other factors—such as intent and often marriage—should 
also be weighed.103 These early cases exhibited the necessity of 
considering a variety of factors when determining parenthood, and so the 
evolution of determining parentage continued. 
 B. Parenting and the Marital Presumption 
 The other major factor besides the genetic tie that was 
historically held to be dispositive in determining parentage is 
marriage.104 Decisions during the explosion of ART and surrogacy were 
consistent in showing deference to marriage as a determinative factor. 
For example, in Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., an 
unmarried surrogate carried twins consisting of genetic materials from 
wife and husband Marla and Steven Culliton.105 The Cullitons sought the 
following two things: (1) a declaration of paternity and maternity; and 
(2) a pre-birth order that would direct the hospital—where the gestational 
carrier was expected to deliver—to designate the [Cullitons] as the father 
and mother on the children’s birth certificates.106 The court found that the 
governing statutes for determining parentage for children born “out of 
wedlock” and for adoption were inapplicable.107 Instead, the court ruled 
that the twins were the children of the Cullitons because they were 
married and had conceived the twins.108  The court reasoned that “[w]hile 
the twins technically were born out of wedlock, because the gestational 
carrier was not married when she gave birth to them, it is undisputed that 
the twins were conceived by a married couple. In these circumstances the 
                                                            
101  In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291–92 (Ct. App. 1998). 
102 Id. at 293 (relying on Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993)). 
103  In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 293. 
104 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 1989); In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 6 
(Cal. 2004); In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal Ct. App. 1998); Wade 
v. Wade, 536 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess 
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children should be presumed to be the children of marriage.”109 The court 
also acknowledged that if the surrogate had been married, it would have 
caused a problem in declaring the Cullitons as the parents because of the 
marital presumption under Massachusetts law.110 
 Another case where marriage played a determinative role is In re 
Jesusa V.111 In this case, the husband of the child's mother and the 
biological father were both seeking to be declared the father of the child 
after the child was taken into protective custody because the biological 
father raped and beat the mother.112  The husband, Paul, had been 
married to the mother at the time the child was born and held the child 
out to be his own child.113 Here, the marital presumption and the 
biological presumption were in direct competition with each other in 
determining parentage.114 The court weighed the competing interests of 
the biological father and of the husband and ruled that it was in the best 
interest of the child that the husband be declared the father of the 
child.115 This decision was supported by the strength of the marital 
presumption and the conduct the husband displayed in caring for the 
child and treating her as his own: 
[T]he court must look to the state interests in 
rendering its decision. The state interests rest on the 
policy to preserve and protect developing parent/child 
relationships which give young children social and 
emotional strength and stability. This is more 
important than establishing biological ties.  In other 
words, there is so much more to being a father than 
merely planting the biological seed. The man who 
provides the stability, nurturance, family ties, 
permanence, is more important to a child than the 
man who has mere biological ties.  By finding [Paul] 
is the presumed father, this court is protecting and 
preserving a family unit, the integrity of the family 
unit.116 
This case weighed the conduct of the husband in holding the child 
out to be his own as a major factor in his favor.117 The court also 
considered the state interest in promoting stability in the family unit in 
rendering its decision, and favored the marriage over the biological 
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father.118 However, without the marital presumption to bolster this 
decision, it is likely the biological father would have been declared the 
father of the child.   
In C.M. v. P.R., a man not married to the mother tried to assert 
conduct as a basis to be declared the father of a child.119 The mother was 
living with the plaintiff when she gave birth to the child, but the two 
were never married and plaintiff was not the biological father of the 
child.120 The plaintiff attended birthing classes with the mother, was with 
her in the delivery room when the child was born, and his name appeared 
on the birth certificate.121 The parties decided that the child would have 
the plaintiff’s last name.122 They lived as a family for three years, and the 
plaintiff was often the primary caretaker of the child while the mother 
worked.123 Although the couple split up, the mother allowed a continued 
relationship between the plaintiff and the child and the plaintiff even 
voluntarily paid child support.124 When the mother ended the visits with 
the plaintiff, he filed a complaint to establish paternity and sought 
visitation rights.125   
The court denied both claims on the basis that the plaintiff was 
neither the biological nor adoptive father nor married to the mother and, 
therefore, there was a lack of support for his right to visitation or 
custody.126 Here, the plaintiff sought to persuade the court to extend the 
“equitable parent” doctrine to the facts of his case.127 The “equitable 
parent” doctrine provides that:  
[T]he husband of the biological mother of a child born 
or conceived during marriage, who is not the 
biological father of the child, may be treated as the 
father if a parental relationship is acknowledged by 
the father and child or is developed in cooperation 
with the mother.128  
 
However, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument and determined 
that a man not biologically-related to the child, who acted like a father, 
should not have the rights of parenthood because the plaintiff was never 
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married to the mother.129 This case showed the unwillingness of the court 
to grant parental rights to a man who acted like a father but did not have 
a biological relationship with the child and did not have the benefit of the 
marital presumption.130 
An opposite result with similar facts occurred in Wade v. Wade, 
where the distinguishing factor was marriage.131 Here, the court looked 
to a former husband’s behavior—holding himself out as the father, 
claiming the child as a dependent, signing the birth certificate, as well as 
“the benefits of his representation as the child’s father, including the 
child’s love and affection, his status as father . . . and the community’s 
recognition of him as the father”—to preclude him from denying parental 
responsibilities of child support upon dissolution of the marriage.132 
Because he was formerly married to the mother and acted like a father, 
he could not escape paying child support notwithstanding the fact he was 
not the child's biological father.133 
Perhaps the most illustrative case that exhibits the strong deference 
to marriage when determining parental rights is Michael H. v. Gerald 
D.134 A child, Victoria D. was born to Carole D. who was married to 
Gerald D.135 However, blood tests showed with a 98.07% probability that 
Michael H., with whom Carole had an adulterous affair, was the 
biological father of Victoria D.136 To make matters even more 
complicated, Carole D. and Victoria D. at times resided with Gerald D. 
and at times with Michael H., and both men held Victoria D. out to be 
their daughter.137  Under California law, a child born to a married woman 
living with her husband is presumed to be a child of the marriage.138 
Michael H., as a putative father, brought an action to establish paternity 
and visitation.139 The Supreme Court ruled, inter alia, that Michael did 
not have a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in a relationship with 
Victoria, notwithstanding his biological relationship and conduct in 
holding her out as his daughter.140 The majority opinion written by 
Justice Scalia spoke about the “unitary family,” which was defined by 
traditional notions of husband, wife, and children living together as a 
family, and the need to protect the it.141   
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The dissent, written by Justice Brennan, discussed the fact that 
Carole D. and Gerald D. were married was a dispositive factor in the 
decision: 
The evidence is undisputed that Michael, Victoria, 
and Carole did live together as a family; that is, they 
shared the same household, Victoria called Michael 
“Daddy,” Michael contributed to Victoria's support, 
and he is eager to continue his relationship with her. 
Yet they are not, in the plurality's view, a “unitary 
family,” whereas Gerald, Carole, and Victoria do 
compose such a family. The only difference between 
these two sets of relationships, however, is the fact of 
marriage. The plurality, indeed, expressly recognizes 
that marriage is the critical fact in denying Michael a 
constitutionally protected stake in his relationship 
with Victoria[.]142 
The result in Michael H. is even more significant, and perhaps 
surprising, when one considers the history of recognition of putative 
fathers’ rights by the Supreme Court in a string of cases dating back to 
1972.143 In Michael H., the court weighed biology, marriage, and 
conduct, and seemingly declared the most important factor was the 
marriage of the non-biological father to the mother.144 With this holding, 
the court strongly affirmed the state interest in promoting marriage, 
which is viewed as leading to a stable and nurturing “unitary family.”145   
 The evolution of the legal definition of a parent was one of 
expansion in terms of what factors courts leveraged when deciding 
parentage disputes. The traditional factors of determining parentage 
through a genetic connection and through marriage remained, but 
necessarily included the factors of intent to parent and conduct of acting 
like a parent in order to achieve a just result in many of these cases.146  
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 C. Parenting and "ART Mixups” 
As discussed, traditional legal frameworks of determining 
parentage through biology, marriage, or adoption were ill-equipped to 
address the myriad of issues that ART produced.147 The UPA addressed 
many of the issues and has been adopted by several states, but gaps still 
remain.148 For instance, it is well established that a sperm or egg donor is 
not a parent—whether the gamete is donated to a single or married 
woman who conceives through ART—with the intent to parent alone or 
parent with a man.149 If the woman that conceived through ART was 
married, her husband will be presumed to be the father if he gave consent 
to the insemination, unless he revoked his consent before the 
insemination or he proves his lack of consent within two years of 
learning of the birth.150 The intended parents in a gestational surrogacy 
agreement become the parents of the resulting child, and the gestational 
surrogate and husband, if any, are not the parents.151 However, the UPA 
fails to address the legal disposition of embryos that are frozen and 
stored for later use by a couple.152 Current law is also not able to 
definitively solve issues that arise in the context of what has been termed 
“ART mix-ups.”153 
 An ART mix-up is what occurs when mistakes are made in the 
process of insemination, usually “where ova are mixed with sperm from 
the wrong man/donor, the wrong donated ova are mixed with the right 
sperm, or where one couple’s embryos are transferred or implanted into a 
wrong woman’s womb.”154 It should be noted that very few of these 
mistakes happen, but are obviously devastating and perplexing in terms 
of who becomes the legal parent.155 As Leslie Bender wrote: 
ART-related mix-ups or mistakes ultimately ask us to 
consider what the relevant prerequisite(s) for 
assigning legally recognized parenthood are and what 
they should be--genetic contribution of gametes, 
gestational contribution, consent and contract, intent 
to create a child, intent to rear a child as its parent, 
existing or pre-existing relationships with the 
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baby/child, the labor of rearing, the parents' needs, the 
child's best interests, social and emotional parenting, 
economic support, legal adoption, or something else. 
They require us to examine this question from a 
justice, equality, relational, and humanist perspective. 
They also ask us to examine the roles race and sex 
biases (and even economic privilege) play in 
distorting our legal conclusions about who is a 
parent.156 
Interestingly, many of the ART mix-up cases involve instances of 
Caucasian women giving birth unexpectedly to mixed-race babies, 
usually of African-American descent.157  Practically speaking, it can be 
presumed these mistakes resulting from ART mix-ups become 
immediately apparent at birth and, perhaps, this contributes to more of 
these cases being reported or even discovered. Leslie Bender, writing in 
2005, observed that ironically all the ART mix-up cases were presented 
in black and white.158 She remarked, “I wish it would be that the answers 
were as legally and ethically ‘black and white,’ but instead we find 
ourselves enveloped in shades of gray, or more appropriately, pinks and 
browns.”159 
 The first known case of an ART mix-up was the 1987 case of 
Lisa Skolnick. a white woman, who wanted to conceive a child with her 
deceased white husband’s sperm.160 When she gave birth to a “dark 
skinned” child, it was clearly the result of a sperm mix-up.161 In April 
1998, Deborah Perry–Rogers and Robert Rogers started the process to 
conceive through IVF.162 Unfortunately, the Rogers’ embryos were 
erroneously implanted in another woman’s uterus. The woman’s name 
was Donna Fasano, and she was also implanted with her own ova 
fertilized by her husband’s genetic material in addition to the Rogers’ 
embryos.163 When Ms. Fasano gave birth to two male babies of two 
different races, it became obvious something went wrong.164 One, a 
white child, was the Fasanos’ biological child named Vincent Fasano.165 
However, subsequent tests confirmed that the other child, who was 
                                                            
156 Id. at 445. 
157 Id. at 446–47. 
158 Id. at 446. 
159 Id. at 447. 
160 Bender, supra note 153, at 447 (citing Cynthia R. Mabry, “Who Is My Real Father?”-
The Delicate Task of Identifying a Father and Parenting Children Created From an In 
Vitro Mix-Up, 18 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 60 (2004-05). 
161 Id. 
162 Perry–Rogers v. Rogers, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21 (App. Div. 2000). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 22. 
165 Id. 
black, was the biological son of the Rogers.166 When the Rogers 
discovered that Ms. Fasano had given birth to a child that could be theirs, 
they commenced an action against the Fasanos.167  The court analyzed 
the situation in the context of Ms. Fasano as the gestational mother and 
Ms. Rogers as the genetic and intended mother.168 Ultimately, the court 
held that the Rogers were the parents of the black baby because they 
were the biological parents and also the intended parents.169 The Fasanos 
were the parents of the white baby by the same reasoning.170 Therefore, 
the genetic tie was a major determining factor in the court’s decision. 
Because the Fasanos were “legal and biological strangers” to the black 
child, the Rogers were pronounced the parents, notwithstanding that 
there was no gestational agreement wherein Ms. Fasano agreed to 
relinquish her paternal rights.171 
 The resolution of an ART mix-up was not as simple in Prato–
Morrison v. Doe, decided in California in 2002.172 In this case, a married 
couple, Donna Prato-Morrison and Robert Morrison, attempted 
unsuccessfully to bear a child through IVF and eventually gave up, 
assuming their embryos were destroyed by the clinic.173 When the clinic 
was later sued for medical improprieties, the couple learned through the 
discovery process that their genetic materials may not have been 
destroyed and that another woman, Judith Doe, may have been implanted 
with their embryos and conceived twin girls.174 The Morrisons brought 
an action to be declared parents of the twins because they believed that 
they were the twins’ biological parents.175 The court denied genetic 
testing of the twins, who were fourteen years old at that time, on the 
basis that it was not in the twins’ best interest to disrupt their lives in this 
manner.176 The court wrote, “[s]imply put, the social relationship 
established by the Does and their daughters is more important to the 
children than a genetic relationship with a stranger.”177 The possibility of 
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the genetic relationship between the Morrisons and the twins was not 
enough to threaten the stability of the Doe family, and the Morrisons 
were left with no children and the belief that the Does were raising the 
twins that were genetically their children.178 In this case, the best interest 
of the children and public policies for protecting the sanctity of the 
family trumped the alleged biological connection.179 
 An opposite result occurred just a year later in Robert B. v. Susan 
B.180 Robert and Denise B., a married couple, had obtained an egg from 
an anonymous donor to be fertilized with Robert’s sperm.181 Meanwhile, 
Susan B., a single woman, went to the same fertility clinic with the intent 
to purchase genetic material from “two strangers who would 
contractually sign away their rights” so “there would be no paternity case 
against her, ever.”182 Three of the embryos from the donor and Robert’s 
sperm were accidentally implanted in Susan and she gave birth to 
Daniel.183 However, Denise gave birth to Madeline, Daniel’s genetic 
sister.184 When the fertility doctor informed Robert and Denise about the 
mistake, Robert and Denise brought a parentage action against Susan.185 
The court ruled that the husband, Robert B., was the child's father, the 
single woman, Susan, was the child's mother, and dismissed Denise B. 
from the parentage action with prejudice for lack of standing.186 Robert 
could not be considered a “mere” donor because his intent for his sperm 
was only to fertilize an egg to be implanted into his wife.187 The single 
woman was the gestational mother and the wife had no genetic 
connection with the child and, therefore, had no standing to claim 
maternity.188 The court also noted that the intent test could only be 
applied as a tie-breaker when two women had equal claims of genetic 
consanguinity and birth, but that regardless it would not be helpful here: 
Moreover, even if we were to invoke the concept of 
intended mother here, which party would qualify? 
Both-and neither. Susan intended to be the mother of 
the child created from an embryo implanted in her 
uterus that day at the clinic-but not that embryo, not 
one belonging to someone else. Indeed, her intent was 
to obtain an embryo created entirely from the egg and 
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sperm of anonymous donors. Denise intended to be 
the mother of the child created from this very embryo-
but not at that time, and she did not intend for another 
woman to bear the child.189 
 
As these ART mix-up cases illustrate, the law determining 
parentage that was evolving often resulted in unsatisfactory and 
conflicting results. The biological tie was weighed heavily in some cases, 
and dismissed in others.190 The marital presumption, as seen in Robert 
B., is gender-specific to males and does not work in the reverse; that is, a 
woman married to the father is not presumed to be the mother.191 These 
inconsistencies illuminate the murky state of the legal definition of a 
parent. Courts were still struggling to leverage the well-settled law of 
determining parentage through biology and marriage, but were looking to 
factors of intent and conduct when faced with the complicated facts of 
parenting disputes caused by ART and surrogacy arrangements.192 These 
new parenting disputes were the proverbial square peg in the round hole 
of the traditional legal definition of a parent. Faced with the inadequacy 
of the traditional legal definition, the rigid historical standard of 
determining parentage through biology and marriage was morphing by 
necessity into a totality of the circumstances test. 
D. Parenting and Same Sex Relationships 
 The necessity of the emerging totality of the circumstances test 
in deciding parenting disputes became even more apparent when 
considering the complex interplay between genetic ties and marriage in 
same sex couple families. Same sex couples are disadvantaged in 
determining parentage by the inherent design of their relationship. 
Procreation through sexual reproduction was never an option for same 
sex couples, and external assistance was needed in order for two same 
sex partners to build a family.193 Therefore, at least one partner would 
not be able to achieve parenthood through the genetic relationship. 
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Marriage was simply not an option for same sex couples, particularly 
during the latter part of the twentieth century.194 Thus, same sex couples 
could not benefit from the marital presumption.195 
In the early 1990’s, courts in California were dealing with more 
cases involving such same sex parents.196 The early case of Curiale v. 
Reagan held that a “nonparent in a same sex bilateral relationship, [does 
not have] any right of custody or visitation upon the termination of the 
relationship [with the biological parent].”197 Here, the court found that de 
facto parent status did not give custody rights to a non-parent over the 
objections of the biological parent.198 As a result, a non-biological 
mother who had raised and developed a relationship with the child did 
not have any parental rights.199 The same year, a California Court of 
Appeal addressed the same issue in Nancy S. v. Michelle G.200 Although 
the court acknowledged that both partners in a lesbian relationship 
intended to raise their children together, it explicitly declined to expand 
the definition of presumed parent to the non-biological mother.201 
 As the years progressed, however, and as more courts were faced 
with same sex parenting issues, the decisions began to evolve. In 1995, a 
case out of Wisconsin, In re Custody of H.S.H. K., produced a standard 
for determining when a non-biological mother should have continued 
access to a child born to a lesbian couple.202 The court stated: 
To demonstrate the existence of the petitioner's 
parent-like relationship with the child, the petitioner 
must prove four elements: (1) that the biological or 
adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the 
petitioner's formation and establishment of a parent-
like relationship with the child; (2) that the petitioner 
and the child lived together in the same household; (3) 
that the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood 
by taking significant responsibility for the child's care, 
education and development, including contributing 
towards the child's support, without expectation of 
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financial compensation; and (4) that the petitioner has 
been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient 
to have established with the child a bonded, 
dependent relationship parental in nature.203 
In this decision, the conduct and parental relationship between the 
non-biological parent and child were grounds for granting parental 
status.204   
Along the same reasoning as In re Custody of H.S.H. K., in 2005 
the California Supreme Court handed down three decisions that changed 
the landscape of same sex parenting rights.205 The lead case was Elisa B. 
v. Superior Court.206 Here, a same sex couple became inseminated 
together using sperm from the same donor so that the children would be 
biological siblings.207 Elisa gave birth to Chance, and Emily gave birth to 
Kaia and Ry, who had Down’s Syndrome and other medical problems.208 
Emily took on the role of “stay at home mother” and Elisa was the 
“primary breadwinner” because she earned more than twice as much 
money as Emily.209 The couple consulted an attorney to discuss adopting 
each other’s children, but never completed the process.210 When the two 
separated, Elisa sought to escape paying child support for the children 
born to Emily on the grounds that she was not genetically related to 
them.211 The court disagreed and held that a child could have two parents 
who were women under the UPA, and that Elisa was the parent of 
Emily’s children because she participated in causing the children to be 
born and held the twins out to be her own children.212 Therefore, Elisa 
was obligated to pay child support.213 
 The two other companion cases similarly established parentage 
in the context of same sex relationships. Kristine H. v. Lisa R. held that a 
biological mother in a lesbian relationship could not challenge the 
validity of a stipulation she made with her former partner declaring that 
both the biological mother and partner were parents of the child.214  
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K.M. v. E.G. held that when lesbian partners decide to have a child, 
where one partner provides her ova and the other partner bears the child, 
both are the child’s parents.215  
 Courts are still faced with issues with regard to same sex 
couples. A case decided in the District Court of Appeal in Florida in 
December 2011, T.M.H. v. D.M.T., held, as a matter of first impression, 
that the statute that required egg donors “to relinquish all maternal rights 
to a resulting child violated the biological mother’s constitutionally 
protected parental rights to the child.”216 Consequently, the form that the 
biological mother signed was not a waiver of her parental rights.217 
Accordingly, the legal definition of a parent evolved from solely 
traditional factors of biology and marriage to essentially a totality of the 
circumstances test. ART, surrogacy arrangements, and same sex couple 
families challenged and expanded the way that courts determine parental 
status and this trend is likely to continue as our society continues to grow 
and change. Shifting views towards who can marry will undoubtedly 
influence the next step in the evolution of the legal definition of a parent. 
For example, views toward same sex marriage are in flux. Elisa B. is 
cited for the proposition that for partners in same sex marriages, 
domestic partnerships or civil unions, spouses can avail themselves of 
the presumption of parentage based upon the traditional marital 
presumption.218 Giving same sex couples who are married, or in a civil 
union, the benefit of the marital presumption when determining 
parentage signals another significant change in the evolution of the legal 
definition of a parent.     
III.  THE PARENTS OF TOMORROW 
 A. Parenting and Same Sex Marriage 
 Currently, married same sex couples in states that permit same 
sex marriage—Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
Washington, and the District of Columbia—should be entitled to the 
same marital presumption as heterosexual couples.219 States that permit 
same sex couples to enter into civil unions or comprehensive domestic 
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partnerships—and essentially grant these couples the same rights to 
parentage as married couples—include California, Hawaii, Illinois, New 
Jersey, Nevada, and Oregon.220   
However, the picture is not so clear when same sex couples travel 
to states where same sex marriage is not yet legalized and/or civil unions 
are not granted the same rights as married couples. These couples are 
getting caught in somewhat of a legal paradox.  For instance, on one side 
of the border in New York, a married same sex couple receives the 
benefits and obligations of the marital presumption, and both partners are 
considered parents.221 Yet, if the couple were to move to a nearby state, 
for instance, Pennsylvania, probably only the biological parent would be 
considered a legal parent.222   
The federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was enacted in 1996 
and purports to allow states to deny recognition to marriages between 
same sex couples in other states.223 Forty-two states, as of 2011, have 
also enacted “mini-DOMA’s,” which proclaim that the state will not 
recognize a marriage or equivalent relationship between same sex 
couples from other states.224 The DOMA analysis results in Pennsylvania 
being able to deny parental rights to the non-biological parent who was a 
legal parent in New York. From a practical perspective, how can 
someone be a parent in one state but not another? The idea is rather 
ludicrous. DOMA was enacted in part as a response to Hawaii’s high 
court’s decision in 1993 that suggested that same sex unions may be 
protected under Hawaii’s Equal Protection Clause.225 There was concern 
at the time that same sex couples would only need visit Hawaii, get 
married, and then return to their home states and receive the benefits of 
marriage.226 In other words, some of the reasoning behind the enactment 
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of DOMA was to avoid forum shopping. It is obvious to a practical mind 
that this restrictive view of marriage—presumably intending to respect 
family and promote values of stability and security—actually results in 
forum shopping.  
Same sex couples who want to be married may move to states that 
recognize same sex marriage.  Once there, however, any potential 
decisions to move out of that state may be effectively blocked because of 
a desire to have both partners recognized as parents to any children. In 
this regard, it can be argued that the effects of DOMA may limit same 
sex couples’ right to move freely from state to state in violation of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.227 Bans 
on same sex marriage also affect the children of these families, 
essentially creating a “second-class citizenship” for them.228 To disallow 
two partners from being married and forming the “unitary family” is 
contrary to the public policy of promoting stable and nurturing 
families.229 As more states legalize same sex marriage, it is clear that 
DOMA and its progeny of mini-DOMA’s will become obsolete. 
Moreover, trends in society seem to be moving away from 
prohibitions on same sex marriage. President Barack Obama’s 
Administration issued a brief in July 2011, which condemned DOMA as 
being unconstitutional by stating that “[t]he official legislative record 
makes plain that DOMA Section 3 was motivated in large part by animus 
toward gay and lesbian individuals and their intimate relationships, and 
Congress identified no other interest that is materially advanced by 
Section 3[.]”230 
 
President Obama also became the first sitting U.S. President to 
publicly support same sex marriage on May 9, 2012, stating: 
I've been going through an evolution on this issue.  
I've always been adamant that  gay and lesbian 
Americans should be treated fairly and equally[.] At a 
certain point I've just concluded that, for me 
personally, it is important for me to go ahead and 
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 affirm that I think same-sex couples should be 
able to get married.231 
 
This announcement is particularly revolutionary because it was 
made merely six months before the 2012 presidential election, during 
President Obama’s campaign for re-election. At least as of now, 
however, the President reportedly has no plans “to pursue new U.S. 
policy on gay marriage . . . because he believes states should decide the 
issue.”232 Polls and surveys currently show that roughly fifty percent of 
Americans support same sex marriage.233 
 Furthermore, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to two cases 
regarding same sex marriage on December 7, 2012—the notorious case 
of Hollingsworth v. Perry,234 originating out of California, and United 
States v. Windsor, originating out of New York.235 In Perry, the court 
will determine whether the Ninth Circuit was correct in its decision that 
the California law known as Proposition 8, which prohibits same sex 
marriage, is unconstitutional on equal protection and due process 
grounds.236 In Windsor, the Justices agreed to review certain provisions 
of DOMA with regard to "whether Congress can deprive legally married 
gay couples of federal benefits otherwise available to married people."237  
During the oral arguments in the Perry case before the Supreme 
Court on March 26, 2013, one of the main issues discussed concerned the 
individual’s constitutional right to get married as it relates to the state’s 
interest in promoting procreation and the unitary family.238 Proponents of 
Proposition 8 took the position in their brief that, as quoted by Justice 
Kagan, “[o]pposite-sex couples are not similarly situated because 
opposite-sex couples can procreate, same-sex couples cannot, and the 
State’s principal interest in marriage is regulating procreation.”239 Justice 
Breyer challenged this viewpoint by asking, “[w]hat precisely is the way 
in which allowing gay couples to marry would interfere with the vision 
of marriage as procreation of children that allowing sterile couples of 
                                                            
231 Carol E. Lee, Obama Backs Gay Marriage, WALL ST. J. (May 10, 2012, 8:05 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304070304577394332545729926.html. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
234 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). 
235 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). 
236 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012). 
237 Bill Chappell & Dana Farrington, Supreme Court Will Review Two Gay Marriage 
Cases In 2013, NPR (Dec. 7, 2012, 3:34 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2012/12/07/166751369/supreme-court-to-review-gay-marriage-laws (last 
visited May 7, 2013). 
238 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (No. 
12–144) [hereinafter Transcript]. 
239 Id. at 16. 
different sexes to marry would not?”240 The discussion continued by 
comparing same-sex couples to opposite-sex couples over the age of 
fifty-five and persons incarcerated, both of whom have a constitutional 
right to marry.241 Here, the Justices were debating whether the ability to 
procreate should be a factor that is weighed in the decision of the Perry 
case.242 Proponents of Proposition 8 asserted that regulating procreation 
is an appropriate factor in deciding who can marry because it is 
consistent with promoting a stable, unitary family.243 Conversely, Perry, 
the party challenging Proposition 8,  essentially argued that regulating 
procreation should not be a factor that is weighed in deciding who can 
marry because there are already those who have the constitutional right 
to marry who do not have the ability to procreate.244 
 Another point discussed during the Perry oral argument further 
weakened the proponents of Proposition 8’s position on regulating 
procreation—the fact that California already gives same sex couples the 
right to adopt and that, currently, there are approximately 40,000 
children in California that live with same sex parents.245 As Justice 
Kennedy pointed out, “[t]hey [children in California] want their parents 
to have full recognition and full status.  The voice of those children is 
important in this case, don’t you think?”246 General Verrilli, as amicus 
curiae for Perry, stated that 
[T]here are 37,000 children in same-sex families in 
California now. Their parents cannot marry and that 
has effects on them in the here and now. A stabilizing 
effect is not there.  When they go to school….they 
don’t have parents like everybody else’s parents.  
That a real effect, a real cost in the here and now.247  
 
Here, the discussion focuses on the fact that California has already 
declared that same-sex couples can become parents through adoption, 
and that there are a substantial number of children living in such families 
today.  This fact nullifies the proponents’ of Proposition 8’s argument 
that same-sex couples should not be allowed to marry because of the 
state interest in regulating procreation to promote stable families.  In 
other words, denying same-sex couples the right to marry actually 
contradicts the state interest in promoting stable families because many 
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same-sex couples are already parents. Quite simply, to act in the best 
interest of such children would be to allow their same-sex parents to 
marry.  
During the oral arguments heard on Windsor, it was reported that at 
least four of the Supreme Court Justices implied that DOMA improperly 
discriminates against same-sex couples because the federal government 
is blocked from recognizing same-sex marriages in states that permit 
such marriages.248 Justice Kagan reiterated a House report that stated 
“Congress passed DOMA to express its ‘moral disapproval of 
homosexuality.’”249 Justice Ginsberg added that “the 1,100 federal 
benefits denied to same-sex couples water down their relationships to 
‘skim-milk marriages.’”250  
Indications from the media reports on the oral argument predict that 
at least parts of DOMA will be struck down when the Supreme Court 
renders a decision in the Windsor case.251 What is interesting to ponder is 
that if DOMA is struck down as unconstitutional, the result is that same-
sex marriage effectively becomes a de facto constitutional right, 
regardless of the outcome in the Perry case. The inevitable result of a 
“no-DOMA” legal landscape with some states granting same sex couples 
the right to marry is wide scale forum shopping. Same sex couples 
desiring to get married will only need to travel to a legally-friendly state 
to get married and their home state will no longer have a legal basis by 
which to deny recognition of the marriage. 
If the Supreme Court were to rule that prohibitions on same sex 
marriage are unconstitutional at the federal level in Perry, or if DOMA is 
struck down in Windsor, then same-sex couples throughout the United 
States could marry and enjoy parental status under the marital 
presumption. If, and when that occurs, the law of determining parentage 
will revert back, at least in part, to a more traditional state. In other 
words, the added factors of conduct and intent would no longer be 
necessary tools for married same-sex couples when fighting for parental 
rights because each parent would benefit from the marital presumption. 
Thus, each parent would be considered legal parents simply because the 
couple was married.  
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 B. Parenting and the Number Two 
Another possibility for parentage law in the future is that the law’s 
obsession with having two parents could be a thing of the past. The 
debate over same sex marriage overlaps in many respects with the debate 
over polygamy or even polyamory.252 Since the Supreme Court decision 
in Lawrence v. Texas253—which declared a state law banning sodomy as 
unconstitutional—both proponents and opponents of polygamy have 
utilized the “slippery slope” argument when advocating for their 
cause.254 The logic goes something like this: if homosexuals have a 
constitutionally protected right to engage in “alternative” intimate 
relationships, then on what grounds may we ban polygamists’ alternative 
intimate relationships? One law professor observed: 
Gay activists champion autonomy in intimate 
relationships and charge that traditionalists simply 
fear what is different and mindlessly mouth religious 
prejudice.  On these grounds polygamy is even easier 
to support because, unlike gay marriage, it has been 
and still is condoned by many religions and societies.  
The Equal Protection argument for same sex marriage 
also applies to polygamy.255 
 
Interestingly, even fundamentalist polygamists—those who base 
their belief on religious grounds—are “‘coming out of the closet’ to join 
the fight for rights recognition for ‘sexual minorities.’”256 If same sex 
marriage is legalized at the federal level, or even if a majority of the 
states eventually recognize same sex marriage, how long will the slope 
stick and not slip? Hypothetically speaking, if everyone could marry 
regardless of sexual orientation or numbers arrangement, the marital 
presumption would cover everyone who was married. The law of 
determining parentage as applied would essentially become what it used 
to be; that is, through birth, marriage or adoption. Intent and conduct 
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would still be available to determine appropriate parentage for those who 
were not married, but would likely be invoked to a much lesser degree. 
Marriage would essentially become the dominant legal means of defining 
parenthood and would be available to everyone regardless of lifestyle 
choices. 
 There is also an argument to be made that the families we have 
today are already "polygamous" or "polyamorous" to a certain extent. 
Scholar Adrienne Davis points out that in 2006, thirty-eight and a half 
percent of children were born to unmarried women, some of whom will 
eventually marry.257 The unmarried fathers of these children born to 
unmarried women may also eventually marry and have offspring, 
resulting in multiple non-marital families, or de facto polygamy.258 Also, 
a significant percentage of married couples divorce, remarry, and start 
new families, which adds to the multiplicity of parents in a family.259   
This notion of de facto polygamy or de facto polyamory is easily 
expanded into the context of families formed by surrogacy and ART 
arrangements, as multiple players in a variety of scenarios may agree to 
declare themselves "parents" and form their families in non-traditional 
ways. There are already glimpses of this in courtrooms today.  For 
example, certain trial courts in California have granted “third parent 
adoptions.”260 A example of a “third parent adoption” is when a sperm 
donor wishes to act as a father to a child born to a lesbian couple.261 
These courts have allowed all three desiring parties to be legally declared 
as parents, “on the condition that the child is at least five years of age and 
the parties can show full bonding of the child with all three parents plus a 
good co-parenting arrangement among the adults.”262 Similarly, in 
Pennsylvania, a trial court awarded de facto parent status—and the 
accompanying rights to visitation and shared custody—to the ex-partner 
of a woman who married after ending the same-sex relationship.”263 
Because the woman’s husband had legally adopted the child and the 
child and the ex-partner had a well-established relationship, the court’s 
decision created a legally protected relationship between the child and 
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the child’s biological mother, biological mother’s husband, and the 
biological mother’s ex partner.”264 Thus, the legitimacy of multiple 
parents in modern families could be positioning to be the next 
evolutionary step in defining parenthood. 
CONCLUSION 
We have seen the traditional ways of becoming a legal parent 
through birth, marriage, and adoption evolve into a combination of 
factors based also upon intent and conduct.265 The test for parental status 
has essentially become a totality of the circumstances test, and 
appropriately so. There is no other test that could adequately encompass 
all the possible combinations of players vying for parental status in 
today's modern families formed through divorces, remarriages, ART, and 
surrogacy arrangements.  
With an eye toward the future, the question arises whether the 
evolution of the legal definition of a parent is becoming more modern or 
more traditional. As anthropologist Marilyn Strathern opined over a 
decade ago, “[i]t would seem we cannot be at both ends of the continuum 
at the same time. I want to suggest that is exactly where we might be . . . 
[w]ould it also follow that one might have both more tradition and more 
modernity at the same time?”266 With the possibility of same sex 
marriage becoming legalized on a federal level, or through a majority of 
the states, it appears that a significantly greater section of the population 
will be recognized as a parent through the traditional marital 
presumption. The fledgling movement towards the recognition of 
multiple parents may end up providing support for polyamorous or 
polygamous family arrangements. If more "alternative intimate 
relationships" are given the freedom to marry, then they, too, will benefit 
from the marital presumption. If this occurs, the traditional way of 
defining parenthood through marriage will benefit a substantial portion 
of the population, and will signal a pendulum swing back to our past. In 
essence, the legal definition of a parent will be both modern and 
traditional at the same time. 
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